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BOOK REVIEW

CONNECTION. By Bruce Allen
Murphy. New York, Oxford, England: Oxford University
Press 1982. Pp. x + 473. Hardbound. $18.95.
THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER

Reviewed by Kathy Andreola*
The publication of Bruce Allen Murphy's The Brandeis/
Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of
Two Supreme Court Justices' created an immediate controversy among judges, attorneys, journalists and the public. On
the front page of the New York Times, it was reported that
Brandeis and Frankfurter had a relationship "unprecedented
in Supreme Court history" in which Brandeis paid Frankfurter over $50,000 during his 23 years on the court to further
Brandeis' views on public policy.' Others claimed the book
lacked "critical inquiry" and that the press coverage of the
book raised more serious questions about ethics in journalism
than ethics in the judiciary.3 Whatever critics may say about
this volume, few historical accounts of the Supreme Court are
as revealing as this one.
Murphy, an assistant professor of political science at
Pennsylvania State University, has amassed in this volume an
amazing amount of detail chronicling the intricate political
lives of two of this country's most lauded and intellectual Supreme Court Justices. While claiming to be merely an historical observer, it is evident that Murphy is attempting to expose
both Brandeis and Frankfurter as persons whose primary role
o 1983 by Kathy Andreola
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1. B. MURPHY, THE BRANDE/FRANKFUtmT
CONNECTION (1982).
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
3. Cover, The Framing of Justice Brandeis, THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 5, 1982,
at 17-21. Cover seriously questions the substantive integrity of many of Murphy's
conclusions. He contends that Murphy misread letters, speculated as to the connection between occurrences, and misinterpreted events to exaggerate and sensationalize
the Brandeis/Frankfurter connection.
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as judges, presumably neutral, removed and fair, conflicted
with their desire to manipulate the political process. However,
it is the conflict between Murphy's role as a neutral historian
and as an investigative journalist desiring to manipulate public opinion which most flaws this book. Murphy, the historian,
hides behind the cloak of his academic role by never directly
concluding that the relationship he has unearthed was wrong,
dangerous or unethical. Yet his work is riddled with innuendo,
broadly hinting at the impropriety of the Brandeis-Frankfurter relationship. The result is confusing and ineffectual because the reader is supplied with abundant facts but is unable
to make firm conclusions regarding the propriety of this type
of judicial-political conduct based on Murphy's myriad of
speculations.
The financial connection between Brandeis and Frankfurter began shortly after Brandeis was appointed to the
Court in 1916. Brandeis wrote a letter to Frankfurter, then a
professor at Harvard Law School and longstanding progressive compatriot to Brandeis, urging Frankfurter to accept payment for expenses he incurred "in public matters." Frankfurter returned the check to his mentor, stating he
appreciated the experience. But Brandeis, undaunted, sent
the check again, explaining that "I ought to feel free to make
suggestions to you, although they involve some incidental expense."' Throughout the years that followed, Brandeis periodically deposited sums in a special account at the Engineers
National Bank in Boston to enable Frankfurter to "further
the public good" by activating Brandeis' progressive ideals at
Brandeis' request.5
The bulk of this book is spent giving the intricate details
of the way that these two men exerted their influence in the
political sphere. Brandeis, on his own, maintained a political
relationship with whatever President was then in the White
House. With President Wilson, Brandeis consulted on legislative strategies for the Army Appropriations Act. With Hoover,
he discussed passage of the Lever Food Control Act. Both
4. B. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 40. While Frankfurter was at first reluctant to
accept these nominal payments, Murphy points out that Frankfurter soon considered
himself an employee of Brandeis and came to depend on the support. He even asked
for a raise in 1925 when his wife suffered a nervous breakdown and needed psychiatric care. Id. at 41-42.
5. Id. at 41.
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bills faced constitutional challenges which reached the high
court during Brandeis' tenure. In neither case did Brandeis
disqualify himself.
Through Frankfurther, however, Brandeis was capable of
a much more subtle influence. Murphy uncovered the fact.
that Brandeis made recommendations to Frankfurter of
timely topics for academic research with suggested conclusions. Frankfurter would then pass these ideas on to his law
students at Harvard as material for law review articles. Murphy deduces that Brandeis could then cite the articles as authority for legislative reform and judicial opinions. In this
way, the Harvard Law Review became a conduit for espousing
Brandeis' views.'
Frankfurter, himself, also published articles in contemporary periodicals at Brandeis' suggestion.8 Although not at
Brandeis' direction, one of Frankfurter's most controversial
articles during this period appeared in the Atlantic Monthly
denouncing the trial procedure by which Sacco and Vanzetti
were sentenced to death in Massachusetts. The highly publicized and irregular trial polarized the Boston Brahmins
against these immigrant "anarchists" at the height of the
"Red Scare." In a letter, Brandeis praised Frankfurter for his
efforts and offered to defray Frankfurter's expenses for doing
so by contributing an extra amount to their expense account.
This is one of the few instances in which Murphy is able
to show any direct connection between the BrandeisFrankfurter financial arrangement and a case coming before
the court. Shortly after the financial transaction took place,
lawyers for Sacco and Vanzetti (having already been rebuffed
by Justice Holmes) attempted to visit Justice Brandeis to obtain a stay of execution pending an appeal to the Supreme
Court. Frankfurter refused to aid the attorneys other than to
provide Brandeis' phone number. Brandeis, when called, refused to meet with them, stating he must disqualify himself
because an old family friend who lived with him had been active in the defense effort. Sacco and Vanzetti were executed
and when their subsequent appeal finally reached the Su6.
7.
.8.
9.
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preme Court, it was summarily dismissed. °
Murphy attempts to demonstrate by this incident the
limitations and dangerous potential of the Brandeis-Frankfurter connection. However, this conclusion is indicative of
his persistent speculation in recreating the events contained
in this book. Murphy doubts whether absent the tie of the
family friend to the Sacco-Vanzetti controversy, Brandeis
would have declined judicial involvement in the case even
though he had financially encouraged Frankfurter's defense
efforts. He condemns Brandeis for putting himself into such a
compromising position, "thereby helping to deprive convicted
men of a right to a fair hearing by the Court's most liberal
member."11 Such speculation as to the Justice's motivations is
completely unfounded. Surely, Brandeis could have recognized from his initial action in supporting Frankfurter's defense efforts for Sacco and Vanzetti that he would have to abstain from any judicial review of the case because of his family
ties, thereby enabling him to show some encouragement to
Frankfurter.
When Roosevelt took office in 1930, Brandeis foresaw a
very congenial environment in which to further his progressive beliefs. Frankfurter and Roosevelt had become friends in
Washington in 1917-1919.12 The three formed what Murphy
calls a "triangular symbiotic relationship,"" which was relied
upon throughout the New Deal years to share information and
ideas on possible reforms. Brandeis and Frankfurter took an
active part in recommending the appointment of persons with
views similar to theirs in top administrative positions, especially in the Departments of Labor, the Interior, and Agriculture. 4 By counselling administration personnel, Brandeis pursued his longstanding goals of instituting unemployment
insurance, a public works program, and more federal regulation of stock market and investment practices through the
taxing power.15
In 1939, Felix Frankfurter was appointed to the bench by
Roosevelt. Brandeis retired two weeks later at the age of 82,
10.
11.
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having served 23 years on the Court. Frankfurter lacked the
prophetic vision his teacher had. Instead, Murphy characterizes him as an "incessant meddler." 16 Still, Frankfurter continued the Brandeis-style of extra-judicial political activity.
With friendly informers already strategically placed in the administration, and through his close relationship to the President, Frankfurter found it easy to exert his influence. For example, Frankfurter strenuously supported the war effort.
Murphy provides endless details of Frankfurter's orchestration of foreign affairs, encouraging the acceleration of support
for France and England, including his practically commandeering Roosevelt's lend-lease program, 7 masterminding
meetings between diplomats in Algiers, and steering national
policy regarding military support for Australia."8
Although Frankfurter reached his political zenith during
the war years while his old friend, President Roosevelt, was
still in office, he continued to obtain information about executive policies and disseminate his ideas after Roosevelt's death
through some of his former law students, now appointees entrenched in government. In addition, the Justice persistently
made recommendations to the President for judicial appointments. Until his retirement in 1962 following two strokes,
Frankfurter worked tirelessly to effectuate his political goals
and those of his mentor Louis Brandeis.
Murphy depicts the extra-judicial activities of Frankfurter and Brandeis as highly unusual. However, in the Appendix, where Murphy finally outlines the history of extra-judicial activity of Supreme Court Justices, Murphy discloses
that the role of Supreme Court Justice has been highly political since its inception. In fact, it has not been uncommon for
Justices to run for political office, even for the Presidency,
from the bench. 19 Judges and lawyers today are expected to be
outspoken in encouraging law reform and court reform. Court
appointments are often made based on those views. It is
therefore not surprising that a Justice would maintain an advisory role to the President who appointed him or her, making
recommendations for judicial appointments and perhaps helping to guide national policy.
16. Id. at 251.
17.
18.

Id. at 214-20.
Id. at 282-87, 289-96.

19. Id. at 356-57.
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Murphy conceded in conclusion that he cannot accuse either Justice of deciding Supreme Court cases in such a way as
to further his political goals, or of using his high position for
personal gain.S The real issue he has tried to present is
whether the Justices acted within ethical standards at the
time they served and what standards should prevail. As discussed above, some extra-judicial activity was common among
Justices then and it is now. As both Brandeis and Frankfurter
avoided any charges of conflict of interest while on the bench,
they seem not to have broken any ethical standard.
However, Murphy infers from the fact that no one has
uncovered the Brandeis-Frankfurter connection before now,
that both Justices perceived their actions as inappropriate
and therefore they attempted to conceal them. He depicts the
relationship as secretive, clandestine, almost subversive, detailing sunrise rendezvous, obscure messages, and hidden
payments.
Again, Murphy's conclusion is flawed by his own interjection of the Justices' motivations. He is quick to speculate
whenever the actions of the Justices were not completely public, that they were purposely kept secret to avoid public scrutiny and allegations of overreaching. An example of this is his
interpretation of why the financial connection between Frankfurter and Brandeis was never made public:
As extraordinary as this financial relationship between
Brandeis and Frankfurter was, there is no indication from
either published or unpublished sources, that any of the
justice's colleagues on the bench ever became aware of it.
Or, if they did discover what was going on, they cared so
little that it was never a cause for either public or private
complaint. One indication of the success of this effort to
hide the relationship from public view is the silence of
Associate Justice William McReynolds. So incredibly
anti-Semitic that he avoided speaking to Brandeis for a
three-year period, refused to sit next to him in the annual
Court picture for 1924 (hence no picture was taken that
year), and on one occasion wrote to Chief Justice Taft,
"As you know I am not always to be found when there is
a Hebrew aboard," McReynolds hardly would have remained quiet had he discovered what was happening.
Perhaps it was the fear of people like McReynolds that in
20. Id. at 342.
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part led Brandeis to consider embarking on such a covert
relationship in the first place.2
The possible reasons for the private nature of the Brandeis-Frankfurter relationship are innumerable. Certainly fear
of Justice McReynolds' anti-semitism is an unlikely incentive
to keep their work secret. More likely, the other Justices
cared little about the relationship unless it affected Supreme
Court work. Further, if the Justices wished to leave no trace
of their relationship, they could have destroyed their correspondence. Murphy's constant speculation into the motivations of the Justices turns a work of considerable historical
research into near historical fiction.
The unanswered query presented by the book is whether
such a relationship to the political activities of the day does
compromise the ability of a Supreme Court Justice or other
member of the judiciary to act as a fair and neutral arbiter of
disputes. Murphy avoids answering this by stating his job as
a historian is simply to record the facts and not set policy.
However, based on the tenuous implications of Murphy's findings, the reader cannot fully evaluate the ethics of this conduct either, turning this work of potentially great significance
to one of mere interest.

21. Id. at 43-44.

